Dans cet appendice, j’aimerais examiner un certain nombre de questions entourant les droits des animaux auxquelles j’ai été confronté au fil des ans. Il s’agit de questions qui sont posées très fréquemment et qui semblent l’être autant dans le contexte états-unien qu’à l’étranger, autant dans les nations occidentales que dans les nations non occidentales et lorsque l’audience est composée d’étudiant(e)s affiliés aux facultés de droit, aux écoles de médecine, aux écoles de médecine vétérinaire, aux écoles secondaires ou encore de gens provenant du grand public, qui appellent lors d’émissions de radio, qui écrivent dans les journaux ou qui discutent à l’occasion des fêtes de famille. Un examen de ces questions pourra aussi aider à démontrer comme la théorie des droits des animaux que j’ai présenté dans ce livre peut être appliquée à des contextes concrets.
1. Question : les animaux domestiques, tels que les vaches et les porcs ou encore les rats de laboratoire n’existeraient tout simplement pas si nous ne les avions pas amenés à naître dans le but de les utiliser. Alors, ne sommes-nous pas libres de les traiter comme nos ressources?
Réponse : Non. Le fait que, dans un sens, nous soyons responsables de l’existence d’un être ne nous donne pas le droit de traiter cet être comme notre ressource. Si c’était le cas, alors nous pourrions traiter nos enfants comme des ressources. Après tout, ils n’existeraient pas si nous n’avions pas fait en sorte qu’ils existent – de notre décision de les concevoir à notre décision de ne pas avorter. Et bien que nous disposions d’une certaine marge de manoeuvre dans le traitement que nous réservons à nos enfants, nous devons respecter certaines limites : nous ne pouvons pas les traiter comme nous traitons les animaux. Nous ne pouvons pas les asservir, les vendre pour la prostitution ou vendre leurs organes. Nous ne pouvons pas les tuer. En fait, nous avons même adopter la norme culturelle voulant que donner naissance à un enfant engendre l’obligation morale, pour les parents, de prendre soin de cet enfant et de ne pas l’exploiter.
Il doit être noté que l’une des justifications qui ont, historiquement, été proposées au soutient de l’esclavage humain aux États-Unis était que plusieurs des esclaves n’auraient pas existés n’eut été de l’institution de l’esclavage. Les esclaves d’origine qui ont été amenés aux États-Unis ont été forcés de procréer et leurs enfant étaient considérés comme des propriétés. Bien qu’un tel argument semble aujourd’hui farfelu, le fait qu’il ait déjà été soutenu démontre nous ne pouvons présumer la légitimité de l’institution de la propriété – humaine ou nonhumaine – et ensuite nous demander s’il est acceptable de traiter des propriétés comme des propriétés. La réponse est prédéterminée. Il faudrait plutôt commencer par nous demander si l’institution de la propriété animale (ou humaine) peut être moralement justifiée.
2. Question : les droits ont été créés par des humains. Comment pourraient-ils être appliqués aux animaux?
Réponse : Tout comme le statut moral d’un humain ou d’un animal n’est pas déterminé par qui a fait en sorte que cet humain ou cet animal vienne au monde, l’application des concepts moraux n’est pas déterminée par qui les a créés. Si des bénéfices moraux ne devaient être accordés qu’à ceux qui sont à l’origine des concepts moraux, alors la plupart des membres de l’humanité se trouveraient à l’extérieur de la communauté morale. Les concepts entourant les droits tels que nous les comprenons actuellement ont été formés de manière à protéger les intérêts des propriétaires terriens mâles, blancs et riches; en fait, la plupart des concepts moraux ont historiquement été créés par les mâles privilégiés afin d’offrir des bénéfices à d’autres mâles privilégiés. Avec le temps, nous en sommes venus à reconnaitre le principe de l’égale considération qui requiert que nous traitions les cas similaires de manière similaire et que nous étendions subséquemment les droit (et les autres bénéfices moraux) aux autres humains. En particulier, le principe de l’égale considération implique que nous considérions l’appropriation de certains êtres humains par d’autres comme quelque chose d’odieux. Si nous voulons appliquer le principe de l’égale considération aux animaux, alors nous devons étendre aux animaux le droit de ne pas être traités comme des ressources.
Qui est à l’origine des droits ou qui peut comprendre le concept de droit sont des questions sans pertinence. Nous n’exigeons pas que les humains soient potentiellement ceux qui inventent les droits ou qu’ils puissent comprendre ces droits pour jouir de droits. Par exemple, un être humain sévèrement retardé mentalement n’a peut-être pas la capacité de comprendre ce qu’est un droit, mais cela ne signifie pas que nous ne devons pas lui accorder au moins la protection du droit fondamental de ne pas être traité par d’autres comme une ressource.
3. Question : Est-ce que l’institution des animaux de compagnie viole le droit fondamental des animaux à ne pas être considérés comme des choses?
Réponse : Oui. Les animaux de compagnie sont nos propriétés. Les chiens, les chats, les hamsters, les lapins et d’autres animaux sont produits massivement, comme les boulons dans une usine ou, comme dans le cas des oiseaux ou autres animaux exotiques, sont capturés dans la nature et transportés sur de très longues distances, voyage pendant lequel nombre d’entre eux meurent. Les animaux de compagnie sont commercialisés exactement de la même façon que les autres commodités. Même si certains d’entre nous traitent bien leurs compagnons animaux, encore plus les maltraitent ou les négligent. En Amérique, la plupart des chiens passent moins de deux ans dans un foyer avant d’être abandonnés à la fourrière ou autrement transférés à un nouveau propriétaire; plus de 70 pourcent des gens qui adoptent un animal le donnent, l’amène à un refuge pour animaux ou l’abandonne. Nous sommes tous au courant des histoires d’horreur concernant le chien d’un voisin prisonnier au bout d’une courte chaine et passant presque toute sa vie seul. Nos villes sont remplies de chats et de chiens errants qui vivent misérablement, qui sont affamés et gelés, qui succombent à des maladies ou qui sont tourmentés par des humains. Certains de ceux qui disent aimer leur animal de compagnie le mutile sans raison en faisant tailler ses oreilles, couper sa queue ou arracher ses griffes afin qu’il n’abime plus les meubles.
Il est possible que vous traitiez votre animal de compagnie comme un membre de votre famille et que vous lui accordiez effectivement une valeur inhérente ou le droit fondamental de ne pas être traité comme une propriété ayant plus de valeur que celle que lui donne le marché; mais si vous deviez changer d’avis et décider d’administrer quotidiennement de sévère râclés à votre chien afin de le discipliner ou de ne plus nourrir votre chat afin qu’il soit davantage motivé à capturer les souris au sous-sol de votre boutique ou de tuer votre animal parce que vous ne souhaitez plus assumer les dépenses financière qui lui sont associées, votre décision serait protégée par la loi. Vous êtes libres d’évaluer votre propriété comme vous le jugez. Vous pouvez décider de polir votre voiture souvent ou vous pouvez la laisser s’éroder. Le choix vous appartient. Tant et aussi longtemps que vous assurez un entretien minimal de votre voiture afin qu’elle passe l’inspection, toute autre décision la concernant, incluant celle de l’apporter au dépotoir, vous revient. Tant que vous procurez un peu d’eau, un peu de nourriture et un toit à votre animal, toute autre décision le concernant, sauf celle de le torturer sans aucune raison, vous appartient, incluant celle de l’abandonner au plus proche refuge (où de nombreux animaux sont ou bien tués ou vendus pour la recherche) ou de le faire tuer par un vétérinaire qui accepte de le faire.
Il y a plusieurs années, j’ai adopté le hamster d’un collègue d’école. Le hamster est tombé malade un soir et j’ai fait appel à des services vétérinaires d’urgence. Le vétérinaire a dit que le coût minimal pour une visite d’urgence était de $50 et m’a demandé si je désirais dépensé cette argent alors que je pouvais me procurer un « nouveau » hamster dans n’importe quel animalerie pour à peu près $3. J’ai amener le hamster chez le vétérinaire de toute manière, mais cet évènement fût l’un des premiers moments où j’ai été conscientisé à propos du statut des animaux comme marchandises.
Comme j’habite avec sept compagnons canins secourus que j’aime profondément, je n’aborde pas cette question légèrement. Même si je perçois mes compagnons comme des membres de la famille, ils demeurent ma propriété et je peux décider dès demain de les faire tuer. Bien que j’apprécie énormément vivre avec des chiens, s’il ne restait que deux chiens dans le monde, je refuserais qu’on fasse en sorte qu’ils se reproduisent afin qu’il y ait plus d’animaux de compagnie et que nous perpétuions ainsi leur statut de propriété. En fait, quiconque se préoccupe réellement des chiens devrait visiter une « usine à chiots » – un endroit où on fait l’élevage de centaines et de milliers de chiens qui sont traités comme rien de plus que des marchandises. Les chiennes sont engrossées répétitivement jusqu’à ce qu’elles soient «usées» et sont alors tuées ou vendues pour la recherche. Nous devrions, bien sûr, nous soucier de tous les animaux domestiques qui sont aujourd’hui en vie, mais nous devons cesser de faire en sorte que d’autres naissent afin que nous puissions en faire des animaux de compagnie.
4. Question : Si vous êtes en faveur de l’abolition de l’utilisation des animaux comme une ressource pour l’être humain, est-ce que cela ne signifie pas que vous vous préoccupez davantage des animaux que de ces humains malades qui pourraient possiblement être guéris grâce à la recherche sur des animaux?
Réponse : Non, bien sûr que non. Cette question est logiquement et moralement identique à celle qui demanderait si ceux qui soutenaient l’abolition de l’esclavage se souciaient moins du bien-être des Sudistes qui devaient faire face à la faillite économique dans l’éventualité où l’esclave serait aboli qu’ils se souciaient des esclaves.
The issue is not whom we care about or value most; the question is whether it is morally justifiable to treat sentient beings–human or non-human–as commodities or exclusively as means to the ends of others. For example, we generally do not think that we should use any humans as unconsenting subjects in biomedical experiments, even though we would get much better data about human illness if we used humans rather than animals in experiments. After all, the application to the human context of data from animal experiments–assuming that the animal data are relevant at all–requires often difficult and always imprecise extrapolation. We could avoid these difficulties by using humans, which would eliminate the need for extrapolation. But we do not do so because even though we may disagree about many moral issues, most of us are in agreement that the use of humans as unwilling experimental subjects is ruled out as an option from the beginning. No one suggests that we care more about those we are unwilling to use as experimental subjects than we do about the others who would benefit from that use.
5. Question: Isn’t human use of animals a « tradition, » or « natural, » and therefore morally justified?
Answer: Every form of discrimination in the history of humankind has been defended as « traditional. » Sexism is routinely justified on the ground that it is traditional for women to be subservient to men: « A woman’s place is in the home. » Human slavery has been a tradition in most cultures at some times. The fact that some behavior can be described as traditional has nothing to do with whether the behavior is or is not morally acceptable.
In addition to relying on tradition, some characterize our use of animals as « natural » and then declare it to be morally acceptable. Again, to describe something as natural does not in itself say anything about the morality of the practice. In the first place, just about every form of discrimination ever practiced has been described as natural as well as traditional. The two notions are often used interchangeably. We have justified human slavery as representing a natural hierarchy of slave owners and slaves. We have justified sexism as representing the natural superiority of men over women. Moreover, it is a bit strange to describe our modern commodification of animals as natural in any sense of the word. We have created completely unnatural environments and agricultural procedures in order to maximize profits. We do bizarre experiments in which we transplant genes and organs from animals into humans and vice versa. We are now cloning animals. None of this can be described as natural. Labels such as « natural » and « traditional » are just that: labels. They are not reasons. If people defend the imposition of pain and suffering on an animal based on what is natural or traditional, it usually means that they cannot otherwise justify their conduct.
A variant of this question focuses on the traditions of particular groups. For example, in May 1999 the Makah tribe from Washington State killed its first gray whale in over seventy years. The killing, which was done with steel harpoons, antitank guns, armor-piercing ammunition, motorized chase boats, and a $310,000 grant from the federal government, was defended on the grounds that whaling was a Makah tradition. But the same argument could (and is) made to defend clitoral mutilations in Africa and bride-burning in India. The issue is not whether conduct is part of a culture; all conduct is part of some culture. The issue is whether the conduct can be morally justified.
Finally, some argue that since nonhuman animals eat other nonhumans in the wild, our use of animals is natural. There are four responses to this position. First, although some animals eat each other in the wild, many do not. Many animals are vegetarians. Moreover, there is far more cooperation in nature than our imagined « cruelty of nature » would have us believe. Second, whether animals eat other animals is beside the point. How is it relevant whether animals eat other animals? Some animals are carnivorous and cannot exist without eating meat. We do not fall into that category; we can get along fine without eating meat, and more and more people are taking the position that our health and environment would both benefit from a shift away from a diet of animals products. Third, animals do all sorts of things that humans do not regard as morally appropriate. For example, dogs copulate and defecate in the street. Does that mean that we should follow their example? Fourth, it is interesting that when it is convenient for us to do so, we attempt to justify our exploitation of animals by resting on our supposed « superiority. » And when our supposed « superiority » gets in the way of what we want to do, we suddenly portray ourselves as nothing more than another species of wild animal, as entitled as foxes to eat chickens.
6. Question: If we did not exploit animals, we would not have society as we now know it. Does this fact not prove that animal use by humans is morally justified?
Answer: No. In the first place, the question assumes that we would not have devised alternatives to animal use if that were necessary either because nonhuman animals were not available or because we made a moral decision not to exploit them as resources. Second, even if animal use were necessary for society as we presently know it, the same argument could be made with respect to any human activity. For example, without wars, patriarchy, and other forms of violence and exploitation, we would not have society as we now know it. The fact that a given activity was a necessary means to what some of us regard as a desirable end does not prove that the means were morally justified. Present-day Americans would not enjoy the level of prosperity that they now enjoy were it not for human slavery; that does not mean that slavery was a morally acceptable practice. Third, there is at least an argument that our present-day society, with its violence, pollution, inequitable distribution of resources, and various forms of injustice is less desirable an end than some think, and that we ought not be so eager to endorse the means that got us where we are today.
7. Question: By equating speciesism with racism and sexism, don’t you equate animals, people of color, and women?
Answer: No. Racism, sexism, speciesism, and other forms of discrimination are all analogous in that all share the faulty notion that some morally irrelevant characteristic (race, sex, species) may be used to exclude beings with interests from the moral community or to undervalue interests in explicit violation of the principle of equal consideration. For example, speciesism and human slavery are similar in that in all cases animals and enslaved humans have a basic interest in not being treated as things and yet are treated as things on the basis of morally irrelevant criteria. To deny animals this basic right simply because they are animals is like saying that we should not abolish race-based slavery because of the perceived inferiority of the slaves’ race. The argument used to support slavery and the argument used to support animal exploitation are structurally similar: we exclude beings with interests from the moral community because there is some supposed difference between « them » and « us » that has nothing to do with the inclusion of these beings in the moral community. The animals rights position maintains that if we believe that animals have moral significance, the principle of equal consideration requires that we stop treating them as things.
A related question that often arises in this context is whether speciesism is « as bad » as racism or sexism or other forms of discrimination. As a general matter, it is not useful to rank evils. Was it « worse » that Hitler killed Jews than that he killed Catholics or Romanies? Is slavery « worse » than genocide? Is non-race-based slavery « worse » than race-based slavery? Is sexism « worse » than slavery and genocide, or is it « worse » than slavery but not worse than genocide? Frankly, I am not even sure what these questions mean, but I suspect that persons considering them assume implicitly that one group is « better » than another. In any event, these forms of discrimination are all terrible, and they are terrible in different ways. But they all share one thing in common: they all treat humans as things without protectable interests. In this sense, all of these forms of discrimination–as different as they are–are similar to speciesism, which results in our treating animals as things.
Finally, there are some who argue that in saying that some animals have greater cognitive ability than some humans, such as the severely retarded or the extremely senile, we are equating those humans with animals and characterizing them in a disrespectful way. Again, this misses the point of the argument for animal rights. For centuries, we have justified our treatment of animals as resources because they supposedly lack some characteristic that we have. But some animals have such a « special » characteristic to a greater degree than do some of us and some humans do not have that characteristic at all. The point is that although a particular characteristic may be useful for some purposes, the only characteristic that is required for moral significance is sentience. We do not and should not treat those humans who are impaired as resources for other humans. And if we really believe that animals have morally significant interests, then we ought to apply the principle of equal consideration and not treat them as resources as well. The argument for animal rights does not decrease respect for human life; it increases respect for all life.
8. Question: Hitler was a vegetarian; what does that say about vegetarians?
Answer: It says nothing more than that some evil people may also be vegetarians. The question itself is based on an invalid syllogism: Hitler was a vegetarian; Hitler was evil; therefore vegetarians are evil. Stalin ate meat and was himself no angel. He was responsible for the deaths of millions of innocent people. What does that say about meat eaters? Just as we cannot conclude that all meat eaters have anything in common with Stalin beyond meat eating, we cannot conclude that all vegetarians have anything in common with Hitler beyond vegetarianism. Furthermore, it is not certain that Hitler actually was a vegetarian. And in any event, the Nazi interest in reducing meat consumption was not a matter of the moral status of animals but reflected a concern with organic health and healing and avoidance of artificial ingredients in food and pharmaceutical products that was linked to the broader Nazi goals of « racial hygiene. »
Another version of this question is that since the Nazis also favored animal rights, does this mean that animal rights as a moral theory is bankrupt and attempts to devalue humans? Once again, the question is absurd. In the first place, the question is based on a factual error. The Nazis were not in favor of animal rights. Animal welfare laws in Germany restricted vivisection to some degree, but they hardly reflected any societal preference for abolishing the property status of animals. After all, the Nazis casually murdered millions of humans and animals in the course of the Second World War, behavior not compatible with a rights position, human or otherwise. It is no more accurate to say that the Nazis supported animal rights than it is to say that Americans support animal rights because we have a federal Animal Welfare Act.
But what if, contrary to fact, the Nazis did advocate the abolition of all animal exploitation? What would that say about the idea of animal rights? The answer is absolutely clear: it would say nothing about whether the animal rights position is right or wrong. That question can be settled only by whether the moral arguments in favor of animal rights are valid or not. The Nazis also strongly favored marriage. Does that mean marriage is an inherently immoral institution? The Nazis also believed that sports were essential to the development of strong character. Does this mean that competitive sports are inherently immoral? Jesus Christ preached a gospel of sharing resources on an equitable basis. Gandhi promoted a similar message, as did Stalin. But Stalin also devalued human beings. Can we conclude that the idea of more equitable resource distribution has some inherent moral flaw that taints Jesus or Gandhi? No, of course not. We no more devalue human life if we accord moral significance to animal interests than we devalue the lives of « normal » humans when we accord value to certain humans, such as the severely retarded, and prohibit their use in experiments.
9. Question: Where do you draw the line on who can have rights? Do insects have rights?
Answer: I draw the line at sentience because, as I have argued, sentient beings have interests and the possession of interests is the necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the moral community. Are insects sentient? Are they conscious beings with minds that experience pain and pleasure? I do not know. But the fact that I do not know exactly where to draw the line, or perhaps find drawing the line difficult, does not relieve me of the obligation to draw the line somewhere or allow me to use animals as I please. Although I may not know whether insects are sentient, I do know that cows, pigs, chickens, chimpanzees, horses, deer, dogs, cats, and mice are sentient. Indeed, it is now widely accepted that fish are sentient. So the fact that I do not know on what side of the line to place insects does not relieve me of my moral obligation to the animals whom I do know are sentient.
As a general matter, this question is intended to demonstrate that if we do not know where to draw the line in a matter of morality, or if line drawing is difficult, then we ought not to draw the line anywhere. This form of reasoning is invalid. Consider the following example. There is a great deal of disagreement about the scope and extent of human rights. Some people argue that health care and education are fundamental rights that a civilized government should provide to everyone; some people argue that health care and education are commodities like any other, not the subject of rights, and that people ought to pay for them. But we would, I suspect, all agree that whatever our disagreements about human rights–however unsure we are of where to draw the line–we most certainly agree, for instance, that genocide is morally wrong. We do not say that it is morally acceptable to kill off entire populations because we may disagree over whether humans are entitled to health care. Similarly, our uncertainty or disagreement regarding the sentience of ants is no license to ignore the interests of chimpanzees, cows, pigs, chickens, and other animals whom we do know are sentient.
10. Question: Do nonsentient humans, such as those who are irreversibly brain dead, have a right not to be treated as things?
Answer: If a human is really nonsentient–not conscious or aware of anything at all and will not regain consciousness or awareness of anything–then, by definition, the human cannot have an interest in not suffering (or in anything else). In such a situation, a compelling argument could be made that it is morally acceptable to use the organs of such a human to save others–and it is common practice to do so if the human has previously agreed to donate her organs or if the family consents.
We should, of course, be concerned about whether an ostensibly brain-dead human really does lack all cognitive activity. We ought also to be sensitive to the concerns of those related to the comatose human; they may oppose the instrumental use of the human for various reasons, such as religious opposition to organ transplantation. But humans who are really irreversibly brain dead are really no different from plants; they are alive but they are not conscious and have no interests to protect. According such humans a basic right not to be treated as the resources of others makes no sense.
11. Question: If we want to treat similar interests similarly, does our recognition that animals have a basic right not to be property mean that abortion should also be prohibited?
Answer: Abortion raises a number of difficult issues, particularly because of the religious dimension of the controversy. Many who oppose abortion believe that ensoulment occurs at the moment of conception. This belief leads some abortion opponents to oppose any measure that will interfere with the subsequent development of the fetus, including the use of intrauterine devices or drugs that prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum on the uterus wall. As far as these abortion opponents are concerned, the fact that a fetus or fertilized ovum is not sentient is irrelevant; the fetus has spiritual « interests » and is considered a full and complete moral being in the eyes of God as soon as it possesses a soul.
Another complicating factor in the abortion debate is that as a cultural matter the status of a pregnant woman as a « mother » and of a fetus as a « baby » tends to kick in immediately after the woman learns that she is pregnant, particularly in cases in which the woman wants to have a child. That is, from the moment of conception, or learning of conception, we tend to think of the fetus as the human person–the baby–that it will become. But that characterization does not alter the biological fact that a fertilized ovum does not have interests in the way that the baby does.
If we approach the abortion question outside the framework of religion and souls, and outside social conventions that characterize a pregnant woman as a « mother » and a fetus as a « baby » from the moment of conception, it becomes much more difficult to understand how fetuses–particularly early-term fetuses–may be said to have interests. Although it is not certain that any fetuses are sentient, it is clear that early-term fetuses are not, and therefore they do not have interests in not suffering–they cannot suffer. Moreover, it is not clear how nonsentient fetuses can have an interest in continued existence. Although a normal fetus will continue to term and result in the birth of a human person, the nonsentient fetus cannot itself have an interest in continued existence.
Sentient beings are those who are conscious of pain and pleasure; those with some sort of mind and some sense of self. The harm of death to a sentient being is that she or he will no longer be able to have conscious experiences. If you kill me painlessly while I am asleep, you have harmed me because you have deprived me of having further experiences as a sentient being that I, by virtue of the fact that I have not chosen to commit suicide, wish to have. And our experience of sentient beings other than humans reasonably supports the position that all sentient beings share in common an interest in continuing to live–sentience is merely a means to the continued existence of organisms who are able to have mental experiences of pleasure and pain. We cannot analogize a fetus and a sleeping person; the fetus has never been sentient and therefore has never possessed the interests that are characteristic of all sentient beings.
If we claim that a nonsentient fertilized ovum has an interest in continued existence simply because there is a high degree of probability that in nine months it will become a child with interests, then we are committed to the view that a fertilized ovum has an interest in continued existence immediately upon conception. And if we can say that a fertilized ovum has an interest in continued existence immediately upon conception, it becomes difficult to understand why we would not also say that a sperm and an egg have interests in conception before their union occurs. The primary difference between the fertilized ovum, and the sperm and egg, concerns probability (it is more probable that a fertilized ovum will eventually become a human baby than it is that any particular sperm will fertilize an egg), and nothing more.
To the extent that we might say, for instance, that it is in the « interest » of the fetus that the pregnant woman not smoke cigarettes during pregnancy, such an assertion is no different from saying that it is in the « interest » of an engine to be properly lubricated or of a plant to be watered. Although it may be prudent for the pregnant woman not to smoke if she has an interest in having a healthy baby (just as it is prudent for us to put oil in our cars or to water our plants), the nonsentient fetus does not yet have an experiential welfare and does not prefer or want or desire anything. In the absence of a religious belief about the ensoulment of fetuses, it is difficult to understand why the abortion of an early-term fetus is morally objectionable or how abortion can be considered a harm to a nonsentient fetus. If the abortion of a nonsentient fetus is morally objectionable, then so would be the use of intrauterine devices or drugs, such as RU 486, that prevent the attachment to the uterine wall of a fertilized ovum. And we may be committed to the view that a sperm and an egg have an interest in being united so that the use of contraception violates the interests of the sperm and the egg. Again, in the absence of a religious framework, such views appear quite untenable.
What if we determine that some fetuses are sentient? Certainly, late-term fetuses react to certain stimuli. It may be the case that such fetuses are sentient and have an experiential welfare. In this case, it would make sense to say that such fetuses have interests. But even if we assume that sentient fetuses have a basic right that prevents their wholly instrumental treatment, abortion presents a most unusual conflict of rights. One right holder exists within the body of another right holder and is dependent upon her for the very existence that serves as the predicate for the fetus having interests in the first place. Such a conflict is unique, and protection of fetal interests risks state intrusion on the woman’s body and privacy interests in a way that no other protection of the basic right of another requires. If a parent is abusing her three-year-old, the state may remove the child in order to protect the child’s interests. The state cannot protect fetal interests without intruding on the bodily autonomy of the woman and forcing her to continue an unwanted pregnancy. But it may be the case that the sentience of fetuses militates in favor of abortion methods that are equally safe for the woman but that preserve the life of the fetus.
12. Question: If we become vegetarians, animals will inevitably be harmed when we plant vegetables, and what is the difference between raising and killing animals for food and unintentionally killing them as part of a plant-based agriculture?
Answer: If we shift from a meat-based agriculture to a plant-based agriculture, we will inevitably displace and possibly kill sentient animals when we plant vegetables. Surely, however, there is a significant difference between raising and killing animals for food and unintentionally doing them harm in the course of planting vegetables, an activity that is itself intended to prevent the killing of sentient beings.
In order to understand this point, consider the following example. We build roads. We allow people to drive automobiles. We know as a statistical matter that when we build a road, some humans–we do not know who they are beforehand–will be harmed as the result of automobile accidents. Yet there is a fundamental moral difference between activity that has human harm as an inevitable but unintended consequence and the intentional killing of particular humans. Similarly, the fact that animals may be harmed as an unintended consequence of planting vegetables, even if we do not use toxic chemicals and even if we exercise great care to avoid harming animals, does not mean that it is morally acceptable to kill animals intentionally.
A related question is: why don’t plants have rights given that they are alive? This is the question that every vegetarian gets in the company of meat eater. These meat eaters may be otherwise rational and intelligent beings, but when confronted with a vegetarian, their discomfort with their diet often rises to the surface in the form of defensiveness.
No one really thinks that plants are the same as sentient nonhumans. If I ate your tomato and your dog, you would not regard those as similar acts. As far as we know, plants are not sentient. They are not conscious and able to experience pain. Plants do not have central nervous systems, endorphins, receptors for benzodiazepines, or any of the other indicia of sentience. Plants do no have interests; animals do.
13. Question: Isn’t taking advantage of medications or procedures developed through the use of animals inconsistent with taking an animal rights position?
Answer: No, it is not. Those who support animal exploitation often argue that accepting the « benefits » of animal use is inconsistent with criticizing the use of animals.
This position, of course, makes no sense. Most of us are opposed to racial discrimination, and yet we live in a society in which white middle-class people enjoy the benefits of past racial discrimination; that is, the majority enjoys a standard of living that it would not have had there been a nondiscriminatory, equitable distribution of resources, including educational and job opportunities. Many of us support measures, such as affirmative action, that are intended to correct past discrimination. But those who oppose racial discrimination are not obligated to leave the United States or to commit suicide because we cannot avoid the fact that white people are beneficiaries of past discrimination against people of color.
Consider another example: assume that we find that the local water company employs child labor and we object to child labor. Are we obligated to die of dehydration because the water company has chosen to violate the rights of children? No, of course not. We would be obligated to support the abolition of this use of children, but we would not be obligated to die. Similarly, we should join together collectively and demand an end to animal exploitation, but we are not obligated to accept animal exploitation or forego any benefits that it may provide.
We certainly could develop drugs and surgical procedures without the use of animals, and many would prefer we do so. Those who object to animal use for these purposes, however, have no control as individuals over government regulations or corporate policies concerning animals. To say that they cannot consistently criticize the actions of government or industry while they derive benefits from these actions, over which they have no control, is absurd as a matter of logic. And as a matter of political ideology, it is a most disturbing endorsement of unquestioned obeisance to the policies of the corporate state. Indeed, the notion that we must either embrace animal exploitation or reject anything that involves animal use is eerily like the reactionary slogan « love it or leave it, » uttered by the pseudo-patriots who criticized opponents of American involvement in the Vietnam War.
Moreover, humans have so commodified animals that it is virtually impossible to avoid animal exploitation completely. Animal by-products are used in a wide variety of things, including the asphalt on roads and synthetic fabrics. But the impossibility of avoiding all contact with animal exploitation does not mean that we cannot avoid the most obvious and serious forms of exploitation. The individual who is not stranded in a lifeboat or on a mountaintop always has it within her power to avoid eating meat and dairy products, products that could not be produced without the use of animals, unlike drugs and medical procedures, which could be developed without animal testing.
14. Question: Is is likely that the pursuit of more « humane » animal treatment will eventually lead to the recognition that animals have the basic right not to be treated as things, and the consequent abolition of institutionalized animal use?
Answer: No, it is not likely. Anticruelty laws requiring the humane treatment of animals have been popular in the United States and Great Britain for well over a hundred years, and we are using more animals in more horrific ways than ever before. Sure, there have been some changes. In some places, like Britain, veal calves get more space and some social interaction before they are slaughtered; in some American states, the leghold trap is prohibited and animals used for fur products are caught in « padded » traps or raised in small wire cages before they are gassed or electrocuted. Under the federal Animal Welfare Act, primates are supposed to receive some psychological stimulation while we use them in horrendous experiments in which we infect them with diseases or try to ascertain how much radiation they can endure before they become dysfunctional. Some practices, such as animal fighting, have been outlawed, but, as I have argued, such prohibitions tell us more about class hierarchy and prejudice than they do about our moral concern for animals. All in all, the changes we have witnessed as the result of animal welfare laws are nothing more than window dressing.
This should not surprise us. Anticruelty laws assume that animals are the property of humans, and it is in this context that the supposed balance of human and animal interests occurs. But as we saw, we cannot really balance the interests of property owners against their property because property cannot have interests that are protectable against the property owner. The humane treatment principle, as applied through animal welfare laws, does nothing more than require that the owners of animal property accord that level of care, and no more, that is necessary to the particular purpose. If we are using animals in experiments, they should receive that level of care, and no more, that is required to produce valid data. If we are using purpose-bred animals to make fur coats, they should receive the level of care, and no more, that is required to produce coats that are soft and shiny. If we are raising animals for food, those animals should receive that level of care, and no more, that is required to produce meat that can be sold at a particular price level to meet a particular demand. If we are using dogs to guard our property, we should provide the level of care that is required to sustain the dog for that purpose. As long as we give the dog the minimal food and water and shelter–a dead dog will not serve the purpose–we can tie that dog on a three-foot leash and we can beat him, even excessively, for « disciplinary » purposes.
We claim to acknowledge that the interest of animals in not suffering is morally significant, but our animal practices belie that claim. If we are really to honor the moral interests of animals, then we must abolish institutionalized animal exploitation and not merely regulate animal use through animal welfare measures that assume the legitimacy of the status of animals as property.
15. Question: Don’t laws like the Endangered Species Act, which prohibits the killing of certain species of animals facing extinction, effectively change the property status of animals?
Answer: No. The Endangered Species Act and similar measures protect only certain species that are valued by humans for human purposes; such laws do not recognize that animals have value other than that which humans bestow. Some people have argued–erroneously, in my view–that these laws actually provide « rights » for animals. In reality, these laws are no different from those that protect a rainforest, a stream, a mountain, or any other nonsentient thing that humans, for whatever reason, decide to value for human purposes. Such measures imply no recognition that the protected species has value of the sort that we attribute to every human being as a minimal condition of membership in the moral community.
Under economic pressure, governments are now seeking to withdraw some species from endangered-species protection and to readmit them as hunters’ prey, so that the fees generated by hunting licenses and the trade in animal parts can help to pay for maintenance of the remaining animals. Moratoriums on killing particular species are almost always eliminated as soon as populations increase beyond bare extinction levels, thus inviting the « harvesting » of excess animals. We do not, however, treat any humans in the same way. We do not regard it appropriate to use homeless people as forced organ donors in order to subsidize the social welfare costs of other homeless people. We do not condone the « harvesting » of humans.
In any event, laws like the Endangered Species Act do not recognize that animals, because they are sentient, have moral value beyond what humans give them. Such laws regard animals as no different from any other resource that we wish to preserve for the benefit of future generations. We temporarily protect animals like elephants so that future generations of humans will have elephants to use, but elephants are, in the end, only economic commodities, and as long as there are enough elephants, we ultimately value ivory bracelets more than we value the interests of the elephant.
Finally, it should be understood that it is unlikely that any significant change in the status of animals as property will come about as the result of legislation or court cases until there is a significant social change in our attitude about animals. That is, it is not the law that will alter our moral thinking about animals; it must be the other way around. It was not the law that abolished slavery; indeed, the law protected slave ownership and the institution of slavery was not abolished by the law but by the Civil War. The present-day world economy is far more dependent on animal exploitation than were the southern United States on human slavery. Animal exploitation is not going to be ended by a pronouncement of the Supreme Court or an act of congress–at least not until a majority of us accept the position that the institution of animal property is morally unacceptable.
16. Question: If animals have rights, does that not mean that we would have to punish the killing of animals in the same way we do the killing of humans?
Answer: No, of course not. It is certainly true that if we as a society ever really accorded moral significance to animal interests and recognized our obligation to abolish and not merely regulate animal exploitation, we would very probably incorporate such a view in criminal laws that formally prohibit and punish the treatment of animals as resources. But that would not mean that we must punish the killing of an animal by a human in exactly the same way that we punish the killing of a human by another human. For example, our recognizing that animals have moral value does not require that we prosecute for manslaughter someone who, while driving recklessly, hits a raccoon. The prosecution of humans who kill other humans serves many purposes that are not relevant to animals. For example, criminal prosecutions allow the families of crime victims to experience some form of closure, and although there is ethological evidence that many nonhuman animals experience grief at the loss of family or pack members, a criminal trial would not be meaningful to them.
17. Question: If animals have rights, doesn’t that mean we have to intervene to stop animals from killing other animals, or that we must otherwise act affirmatively to prevent harm from coming to animals from any source?
Answer: No. the basic right not to be treated as a thing means that we cannot treat animals exclusively as means to human ends–just as we cannot treat other humans exclusively as means to the ends of other humans. Even though we have laws that prevent people from owning other humans, or using them as unconsenting biomedical subjects, we generally do not require that humans prevent harm to other humans in all situations. No law requires that Jane prevent Simon from inflicting harm on John, as long as Jane and Simon are not conspirators in a crime against John or otherwise acting in concert, and as long as Jane has no relationship with John that would give rise to such an obligation.
Moreover, in the United States at least, the law generally imposes on humans no « duty to aid » even when other humans are involved. If I am walking down the street and see a person lying passed out, face down in a small puddle of water and drowning, the law imposes no obligation on me to assist that person even if all I need to do is roll her over, something I can do without risk or serious inconvenience to myself.
The point is that the basic right of humans not to be treated as things does not guarantee that humans will aid other humans, or that we are obligated to intervene to prevent harm from coming to humans from animals or from other humans. Similarly, the basic right of animals not to be treated as things means that we cannot treat animals as our resources. It does not necessarily mean that we have moral or legal obligations to render them aid or to intervene to prevent harm from coming to them.
18. Question: Isn’t the matter of whether animals ought to be accorded the basic right not to be treated as our resources a matter of opinion? What right does anyone have to say that another should not eat meat or other animal products or how they should otherwise use or treat animals?
Answer: Animal rights are no more a matter of opinion than is any other moral matter. This question is logically and morally indistinguishable from asking whether the morality of human slavery is a matter of opinion. We have decided that slavery is morally reprehensible not as a matter of mere opinion, but because slavery treats humans exclusively as the resources of others and degrades humans to the status of things, thus depriving them of moral significance.
The notion that animal rights are a matter of opinion is directly related to the status of animals as human property; this question, like most others examined here, assumes the legitimacy of regarding animals as things that exist solely as means to human ends. Because we regard animals as our property, we believe that we have the right to value animals in the ways that we think appropriate. If, however, we are not morally justified in treating animals as our property, then whether we ought to eat meat or use animals in experiments or impose pain and suffering on them for sport or entertainment is no more a matter of opinion than is the moral status of human slavery.
Moreover, as long as animals are treated as property, then we will continue to think that what constitutes « humane » treatment for your animal property really is a matter of opinion because you get to decide how much your property is worth. Just as we have opinions about the value of other things that we own, we can have opinions about the value of our animal property. Although our valuation of our property may be too high or too low relative to its market value, this is not generally considered a moral question. So when Jane criticizes Simon because he beats his dog regularly in order to make sure that his dog is a vicious and effective guard dog, Simon is perfectly justified in responding to Jane that her valuation of his property is not a moral matter up for grabs, but a matter of his property rights.
On another level, this question relates to a subject discussed in the Introduction, the position that all morality is relative, a matter of convention or convenience or tradition, with no valid claim to objective truth. If this were the case, then the morality of genocide or human slavery or child molestation would be no more than matters of opinion. Although it is certainly true that moral propositions cannot be proved in the way that mathematical propositions can, this does not mean that « anything goes. » Some moral views are supported by better reasons than others, and some moral views have a better « fit » with other views that we hold. The view that we can treat animals as things simply because we are human and they are not is speciesism pure and simple. The view that we ought not to treat animals as things is consistent with our general notion that animals have morally significant interests. We do not treat any humans exclusively as the resources of others; we have abolished the institution of human property. We have seen that there is no morally sound reason to treat animals differently for purposes of the one right not to be treated as a thing, and that the animal rights position does not mean that we cannot prefer the human over the animal in situations of true emergency or conflict where we have not manufactured that conflict in the first place by violating the principle of equal consideration.
19. Question: Doesn’t the animal rights position represent a « religious » view?
Answer: No, not necessarily, although the idea that we should not treat animals as things is certainly present in some primarily non-Western religious systems, such as Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. The irony is that the notion of human superiority used to justify animal agriculture, vivisection, and other practices often does represent a religious position. For the most part, not only has the Judeo-Christian tradition endorsed the view of animals as things, it has been a primary support of the notion of human superiority to animals and of humans’ right to use animals as resources. We saw, for instance, that the modern Western notion of animals as property can be traced directly to a particular interpretation of the Old Testament, according to which God created animals as resources for human use. Arguments for qualitative distinction between humans and animals have often rested on nothing more than humans’ supposed God-given superiority, which in turn rests on humans’ good fortune in having been made « in God’s image. »
The animals rights position articulated in this book does not rely on any theological beliefs; it requires only a simple application of the principle of equal consideration. Humans exclusively possess no special characteristic, nor are they free of any defect that they attribute to animals.
20. Question: Of course the amount of animal suffering incidental to our use of animals is horrendous, and we should not be using animals for « frivolous » purposes, such as entertainment, but how can you expect people to give up eating meat?
Answer: In many ways this is an appropriate question with which to conclude our discussion because the question itself reveals more about the history of the human/animal relationship than any theory, and it demonstrates our confusion about moral matters in general.
Many humans like to eat meat. They enjoy eating meat so much that they find it hard to be detached when they consider moral questions about animals. But moral analysis requires at the very least that we leave our obvious biases at the door. Animal agriculture is the most significant source of animal suffering in the world today, and there is absolutely no need for it. Indeed, animal agriculture has devastating environmental effects, and a growing number of health care professionals claim that meat and animal products are detrimental to human health. We could live without killing animals and could feed more of the world’s humans–the beings we always claim to care about when we seek to justify animal exploitation–if we abandoned animal agriculture altogether.
The desire to eat meat has clouded some of the greatest minds in human history. Charles Darwin recognized that animals were not qualitatively different from humans and possessed many of the characteristics that were once thought to be uniquely human–but he continued to eat them. Jeremy Bentham argued that animals had morally significant interests because they could suffer, but he also continued to eat them.
Old habits die hard, but that does not mean they are morally justified. It is precisely in situations where both moral issues and strong personal preferences come into play that we should be most careful to think clearly. As the case of meat eating shows, however, sometimes our brute preferences determine our moral thinking, rather than the other way around. Many people have said to me, « Yes, I know it’s morally wrong to eat meat, but I just love hamburgers. »
Regrettably for those who like to eat meat, this is no argument, and a taste for meat in no way justifies the violation of a moral principle. Our conduct merely demonstrates that despite what we say about the moral significance of animal interests, we are willing to ignore those interests whenever we benefit from doing so–even when the benefit is nothing more than our pleasure or convenience.
If we take morality seriously, then we must confront what it dictates: if it is wrong for Simon to torture dogs for pleasure, then it is morally wrong for us to eat meat.
Gary L. Francione
© 2007 Gary L. Francione